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Abstract
This paper investigates the history of economic bubbles and attempts to identify whether there are
direct  correlations  between  different  bubbles.  To  support  this  research,  literature  has  been
consulted  on  historical  and  recent  bubbles,  theories  surrounding  speculation,  the  market  for
venture capital, and bubbles in the technology sector. By analysing a range of bubbles, rather than
just those in the technology sector, general bubble-principles are also identified. All the economic
bubbles are classified under “uncontrolled risk” and a recommended method that can detect and
analyse full impacts by uncontrolled risk will be presented, together with future directions to be
discussed. 
1 Definition 
Eatwell et al (1987) define speculative investors as those that are “interested in profits from trading
in  the asset  rather  than its  use or  earnings  capacity”.  As  such,  non-speculative  investors are
interested in gaining from the development of a product, or gaining from the earnings of such a
venture. Further to Eatwell’s  definition,  Siegel (2003) adds that  this implies the involvement of
“momentum” investors, whose aim is to sell  to other investors at a higher price, as quickly as
possible.  Under  this  definition,  almost  any investment  targeting  a  capital  appreciation  may be
classed  as  a  speculative  one.  Many  of  the  investment  activities  examined  in  this  paper  are
speculative, taking place due to publicity, popularity or the “momentum” of a scheme. These factors
generally lead to increased risk in such investments.
In this context, an economic “bubble” is defined as a period in which speculative investment leads
to an overvaluation of securities within a particular sector (Siegel, 2003). Economic bubbles may
“burst” when investors realise that the industry within the bubble is not as profitable or sustainable
as they first thought. At this point, valuations of the companies and securities involved descend
rapidly to pre-bubble levels. Many bubbles are only categorised as such after they have “burst”.
Scientifically defining the term “bubble” is a subject of some debate, particularly bubbles which
have yet to collapse (O’Hara, 2008). 
The financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 period has resulted in economic downturns in many countries
with high unemployment rates and economic bubbles at national and international levels. Causes
included  a  lack  of  governance,  easy  and  uncontrolled  mortgage  lending,  speculation  of  the
financial  market  and  finally  inappropriate  use  of  irrelevant  models  for  speculation  resulting  in
evaporation of “hot-money” (Hamnett,  2009;  MacKenzie and Spears,  2012; Chang 2014). This
motivates us to investigate all economic bubbles to understand the causes, ways to minimise their
impacts and any correlation between bubbles. This paper starts with a review of historic bubbles in
Section 2 and technology bubbles in Section 3. While taking lessons learned, Section 4 explains
whether  past  bubbles  can  be  relevant  to  technology  bubbles  including  Web  2.0.  Section  5
discusses a suitable model to analyse “uncontrolled risk”, the overall factor that causes economic
bubbles and the future of Web 2.0. Section 6 give a conclusion and describes future work.
    
2 Historic Bubbles 
A number of economic bubbles occurred during the last 400 years. Several have been studied for
this review: the dot-com bubble, the Winchester Disk industry, the “Railway Mania”, the South Sea
Company and the “Tulip Mania”.
2.1 The “Tulip Mania” (1634 - 1637) 
The Tulip  Mania  involved  the  establishment  of  a  futures  market  in  the  Netherlands,  in  which
contracts of sale were traded for tulip bulbs before the end of the growing season. Tulips had to be
traded as bulbs, as it was not feasible to transport the live plants. Tulips had been introduced to
Western  Europe  in  the  middle  of  the  16th century  and  were  becoming  a  status  symbol  of
successful merchants (Garber, 1989). Until 1634, bulbs were grown and sold solely by professional
growers.
After 1634, a broad group of amateurs also began growing bulbs. This led to the emergence of
new and vivid tulip variants, which were particularly sought-after. Prices for bulbs of these novel
variants rose with their  popularity.  Each tulip plant may,  over three to seven years,  produce a
number of additional bulbs and seeds.  These maybe removed from the plant  and traded.  The
simple mathematics of purchasing one bulb, and being able to sell several spawned bulbs a few
years later caused some to acknowledge that plantation is a type of investment (Garber, 1989).
The seasonal nature of the tulip commodity meant that traders exchanged contracts on tulip bulb
futures. That is, contracts were made to buy and sell (at a specified price) quantities of tulip bulbs
that were not yet ready. Traders had to forecast demand, and purchase futures accordingly.
A formal futures market was established in 1636, making it easier to trade the contracts. The price
of tulip bulbs subsequently rose steadily as traders assumed that wealthy foreign individuals would
always  purchase  bulbs  of  the  novel  vivid  varieties,  regardless  of  the  price.  This  assumption
seemingly arose due to the popularity of bulbs amongst wealthy Dutch families. Growers often
created new variants, fostering a perception of fashion in tulip varieties and subsequent price rises.
Traders  believed  they  could  always  make  a  profit  due  to  the  perceived  desirability  of  their
constantly evolving product.
However, by February 1637(three years after the introduction of novel varieties), traders realised
that no-one would actually pay such great prices for tulip bulbs. The price quickly declined to its
pre-bubble state (Garber, 1990). Many had purchased expensive tulip bulb futures, speculating
that they could re-sell the spawned bulbs three to seven years later.
Based on the literature review, this bubble appears to have formed for the following reasons:
 Excitement  and  hype  surrounding  the  commercial  viability  of  a  new  product,  recently
introduced to the continent.  This was fuelled by continual product development, fostering
the creation of new varieties, perceived as desirable.
 Over-estimation of  demand for  the product.  Traders failed to anticipate the factors that
limited  demand,  assuming  growth  would  come  from  overseas  as  easily  as  it  had
domestically.
 The  notion  that  the  product  represented  a  viable  growth  investment.  In  reality,  the
mechanics of supply and demand ended the bubble before any purchased tulips would
have spawned new bulbs.
2.2 The South Sea Company (1720) 
The South Sea Company was formed in London as an intricate method of providing funding to the
government following the War of the Spanish Succession (Garber, 1990). The scheme was similar
to one that was run in France by John Law. In 1705, Law published an economic theory that
ultimately led to the establishment of national banks and paper currency, as opposed to physical
gold and silver, described as “unemployed resources” by Law (1705).
Law also suggested that to raise finance for  a venture,  an entrepreneur need only make bold
claims  about  their  undertaking,  and  sell  shares  in  the  scheme  at  increasing  prices.  The
revenue-generation  of  the  venture  was  purported  to  eventually  raise  public  confidence  in  the
shares, stabilising the price (Garber, 1990).
The  South  Sea  Company  is  an  example  of  one  such  venture.  Individuals  holding  £9.47m
(approximately equivalent to £1.89tn in 2014) of short-term government bonds were convinced to
exchange them for shares in the South Sea Company, effectively writing off the government debt
(Temin & Voth, 2004). In exchange, the government granted the Company a monopoly on trade via
the “South Sea” (i.e., to South America) and paid the Company an annuity of 6% revenue. The
annuity was intended to provide the company with ample revenue to fund its ventures.
Until  1720,  the Company issued shares so it  could fund further government debt  acquisitions,
fulfilling its purpose to write-off government debt. At this point, the company began promoting the
potential of its South American trade monopoly. This, and the government’s decision to allow the
company to autonomously set share prices autonomously on stock issues, inflated share prices
from £130 (per hundred shares) in January 1720 to £950 in July of the same year. This is shown in
Figure 1, which is adapted from Temin & Voth (2004).
Many politicians were persuaded to invest in the venture, and were offered generous exclusive
share schemes (Garber, 1990). This served to secure high-profile political support for the venture,
further increasing publicity and the share price.
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Figure 1 – Share price of the South Sea Company during 1720
Many shares in the company were sold as subscription shares to make the scheme feasible for a
wider  audience.  Under  the  South  Sea  Company’s  subscription  scheme,  investors  provided  a
down-payment and scheduled instalments in exchange for a specified number of shares. Investors
received a fraction of a real share per instalment.
If the value of the company rose during the subscription, then the investor would gain shares worth
more than he paid for them, and have the convenience of spreading the payments. The company
gained the down-payment and the later subscriptions, making this scheme instrumental in raising
capital quickly and providing reliable, regular income in the medium-term.
However, Shea (2004, 2007) hypothesised that owners of subscription shares perceived them as a
type of call option; they were obliged to pay the subscription, but could choose to default in the
future if the subscription did not appear worth paying. This would be a cost-effective strategy when
the share price of the company was sufficiently below the price of the subscription, making the
subscription a more expensive means of purchase.
Furthermore,  the  Company  introduced  a  programme  offering  investors  cash  loans,  taking
Company shares (regular and subscription) as collateral. The cash was sourced from subscription
share instalments. This type of arrangement would become particularly expensive for the Company
if the value of the shares held as collateral fell so much that the recipient of the loan was unable to
afford or repay it (Shea, 2007).
Prices of shares in the South Sea Company began to fall during the third quarter of Year 1720,
when instalments were due for subscription shares. Many shareholders found themselves unable
to afford the subscription, unless they sold their shares. Many defaulted, reducing cash flow from
the subscription shares scheme. Insufficient records are available to attribute the decline to the
loans programme definitively, although it is likely. 
Coupled with similar events occurring internationally,  this caused the share price to fall  rapidly
(Smant,  2012).  As  the  price  fell  below  that  of  subscription  share  purchase  prices,  many
investments  were  rendered  worthless.  The  subscription  share  scheme effectively  allowed  the
South Sea Company to set its own share price but the price of a share is representative only if
someone is willing to buy at that price. Thus, the share price of the South Sea Company had to fall,
due to the collapse in demand. 
The actions of the company directors may be regarded as irresponsible, in particular the methods
by which shares were structured and marketed, but no illegal activities took place. In contrast to
the “Tulip Mania”, this bubble appears to have formed due to speculation surrounding the potential
of a new venture about which the potential investors knew very little, rather than a new product.
The speculation  was  catalysed  by people  in  the  company acting  to  increase  the  share  price
artificially.
The Bubble  Act  1720 was introduced as  an instrument  to  control  inflating share schemes.   It
prohibited companies from trading shares without permission from the government.
2.3 The “Railway Mania” (1840-1846) 
This bubble occurred in the UK during the 1840s, shortly after the Industrial Revolution. The first
railways were demonstrated as an effective method of transporting passengers and goods, and
appeared to be a key industry in a time when the country was increasing output of manufactured
goods (McCartney & Arnold, 2003).
The Industrial Revolution had also created wealth for many middle-class families. The Bubble Act
1720, enacted following the South Sea Bubble, had recently been repealed. This enabled railway
companies to sell  shares without  Government  oversight,  and many middle-class families were
financially capable of making the investment (McCartney & Arnold, 2003). Many companies were
provisionally registered with the prospect of building various railways. Figure 2 shows how few of
these provisional registrations were actually completed.
Some of  these companies sold shares in their  projects in  exchange for  a 10% deposit,  whilst
retaining the right to demand the remaining 90% at any time. The strong success of early railway
projects, combined with the strong marketing for further rail projects, led many middle-class people
to invest in these schemes, and sometimes more than they could afford.
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Figure 2 – Provisional vs. Complete Registrations of Rail Companies 1845-1854 (Taylor, 2006)
Whilst liberated from the Bubble Act1720, Railway construction projects still  had to petition the
government to approve their route and permit land purchases (Odlyzko, 2010). The proposals of
many companies were passed with minimal intervention because various MPs had invested in the
projects themselves. 
However, the difficulty in constructing railways was realised only when several rail  construction
projects actually started. This rendered many of the rail projects demonstrably unviable, so the
speculation ended and many projects collapsed.
This bubble appears to have occurred due to investor speculation surrounding the unexplored
potential  for  railways.  The speculation was driven by rail  companies and other  investors,  who
believed  that  rail  technology  could  transform transport  whilst  being  profitable.  However,  in  its
infancy, the limits and returns of rail technology were unknown, so all the investors would have
been operating in an unfamiliar  environment,  reducing their  ability to evaluate the rail  projects
adequately prior to making an investment.
2.4 Financial crisis in 2007-2009
The largest financial crisis after the second world war started in 2007 in the US, whereby a large
scale of housing bubbles triggered the crash of the US market, known as the ‘credit crunch’. As the
term has implied, it was extremely easy to borrow credits for mortgages without performing serious
credit checks on mortgage applicants (Mian and Sufi, 2008). When more people could not pay up
mortgages on time and houses had more difficulties to be resold, banks had less cash available
while the rate of mortgages had not changed. The problem could become worse when the same
situation persisted for some time. As a result, many banks were unable to provide sufficient credit
and borrowed money between each other. Eventually when money ran out, closure of banks and
loss of credit due to toxic debts happened. It then escalated into international problems, particularly
for western countries due to the similarity in the banking structures and lack of cash return lending
to the banks based in the US (Brunnermeier, 2008; Mian and Sufi, 2008). 
In the UK, financial crisis started its toll since 2008 where the first wave of hit happened in the
finance industry, whereby there was a mass job lost in 2008 when several investment banks closed
in London and the Royal Bank of Scotland’s (RBS) toxic debts came to light in 2008. The UK
Government  rescued  the  RBS by putting  a  nearly  £50  billion  credit  in.  Then  this  resulted  in
problems with borrowing more money, making the UK more vulnerable to higher unemployment
rate and cuts in public services to keep the bill (Foster and Magdoff, 2009; Legrain, 2010). While
taking its toll in 2009, there was numerous public protests in 2009. Financial crisis between 2007
and 2009 have promoted the UK Government to think of the national strategies to cut the bill,
including raising taxes for the rich, cutting public services, reducing annual spending on military,
research  and  conservation  and  tightening  on  governance  on  financial  services.  The  UK  has
performed slightly better than the majority of the western developed economies up-to-date but still
has not entirely been free from the damaging impacts from the financial crisis in 2007 and 2009
(UK Government, 2015).
2.5 Discussion 
The bubble situations described above occurred in different centuries and very different industries.
However, they all developed due to investors having higher expectations of a new technology or
product  than  was  actually  deliverable.  The  primary  driver  for  their  growth  was  speculation
surrounding the companies or industries involved. In some cases, this led investors and those
involved in the ventures to perform insufficient due diligence – taking time to critically analyse an
investment or investment opportunity to find whether it is aligned with the investor’s objectives and
attitudes to risk (Pack, 2002). This concept is discussed further in section 3.4.
In some cases, the “inflation” of bubbles appears to have been due to corrupt and/or unethical
activities  by  stakeholders.  During  the  Railway  Mania  and  South  Sea  bubbles,  for  example,
companies  ensured  that  certain  government  officials  had  a  personal  interest  in  their  venture
(Garber, 1990; Odlyzko, 2010), making it easier to gain government acceptance and support for
their  ventures.  While  this  may be  the  case,  they  were  legitimate  operations  according  to  the
legislation of their  time.  In the cases of  many historic bubbles,  legislation was implemented to
prevent similar events from occurring again (Garber, 1990; Taylor, 2006).
However, this is not the only factor affecting the growth of early bubbles. These ventures depended
upon the showmanship of their promoters their ability to energise potential investors about novel
ideas, and their ability to inflate share prices. It  may be argued that an appropriate process of
critical evaluation through due diligence should be the panacea to showmanship or speculation
surrounding a venture. However, showmanship and marketing tactics may lead a potential investor
to think less critically, and neglect some due diligence.
Nevertheless, in all the cases described above, showmanship and/or speculation surrounding the
novel product contributed to the growth of a bubble. This indicates that investors have difficulty
performing due diligence upon ventures that operate in areas outside of the investor’s expertise.
Table 1 provides an overview of the bubbles and themes that have been discussed in this section.
Technology sector bubbles are covered in the next section.
Table 1: Overview of Economic Bubbles
Bubble Date Location New Product
or Venture
Product or 
Venture
Investor 
Classes
Government 
Corruption
“Railway 
Mania”
1840s UK Yes Trade Middle and 
Aristocracy
Yes
South Sea 1720 UK Yes Government 
Debt and Trade
All Yes
“Tulip Mania” 1630s Holland Yes Trade Middle and 
Aristocracy
Yes
Financial 
crisis
2007-
2009
UK and 
developed 
western 
economies
No Government 
Debt
All Yes
The economic bubbles detailed in this section appear to have exhibited positive feedback loops as
a  mechanism  of  their  growth.  Many  investments  were  made  in  these  schemes  without  due
diligence because the share or product price was rising, and investors speculated that they could
make a capital gain. However, the act of purchasing products or shares increased the unit price,
which fuelled speculation amongst those who had invested. This in turn led to further investment,
and represents a positive feedback loop.
Financial  crises  and "bubbles"  which can occur  on an international  scale  arise  as  a  result  of
complex international issues and have triggered economic crashes in most western economies.
Australia  and New Zealand are  notable  exceptions;  they seem to rely  much less  on US and
European lending businesses as a result of their isolated locations. As discussed in Section 2.4,
bubbles often arise from a lack of governance and credit control on mortgages and investments
made  by  banks.  This  means  that  better  transparency,  governance,  risk  management  and
international co-operation for tackling problems in finance sector is increasingly important, since
the scale of the losses can be beyond control by many governments. One of the most well-known
examples is the bankruptcy of the Icelandic Government at the end of Year 2008 which can be
attributed to poor control of government borrowing (Foster and Magdoff, 2009). 
Investment  in  these  schemes  represents  an  abstraction  of  involvement  in  the  underlying
businesses and products. Had investors considered the effects of supply and demand in the Tulip
or Railway Manias, then the bubbles may have been less severe. Promotion, hype, and abstraction
from the underlying product may have inhibited investors’ rational consideration in these situations.
For  the purposes of  summarising the key drivers behind each bubble,  the following stages of
bubble development are defined.
 Initial  Development.  Covering  very  early  development  of  the  bubble,  before  it  exhibits
significant growth.
 Growth and Performance. The stage at which valuations of securities within the bubble rise
beyond  rational  levels.  A “rational”  valuation  being,  perhaps,  defined  as  one  obtained
through  a  calculative  process  of  valuing  the  assets  underlying  security,  ignoring  the
influence of factors that may provoke speculation.
 Collapse. When the bubble “bursts”, causing valuations to return to rational levels.
Table 2 shows a summary of the key drivers behind the three bubbles described in this section,
according to the stages above.
Tulip Mania South Sea Co. Railway Mania
Initial
Development
Speculation
surrounding  a  novel
product.
Speculation  surrounding
the  prospect  of  lucrative
trade.
Speculation surrounding the
prospect  of  novel  rail
trade/transport.
Growth  and
Performance
Speculation
surrounding  prices  for
the product.
Schemes  that  permitted
anyone  to  invest  in  the
venture, and marketing.
Schemes  that  permitted
anyone  to  invest  in  the
venture, and marketing.
Collapse Realisation  that
speculated prices were
irrational.
Lack  of  actual  trade;
unsustainable  financial
situation.
Realisation  of  technological
limitations, costs, and actual
requirements.
3 Technology Bubbles 
Many technology companies are (or have been) supported by venture capital companies (Hellman
& Puri, 2002). Technology companies (particularly those producing software products) have a short
development cycle.  As such, technology start-ups may find themselves in competition with other
start-ups before they have shipped a product, making investment in the sector risky (Sahlman,
1997).  Venture  capitalists  supporting  these  companies  typically  expect  a  percentage  of  their
portfolio  companies  to  fail  completely  and  a  relatively  small  percentage  to  achieve  significant
success (Cochrane, 2005). The remainder are expected to achieve “success” (i.e., some return on
investment) but not significant success. 
Agility  has  been  mentioned  as  a  beneficial  trait  to  be  possessed  by  a  technology  start-up.
Companies that fail to adapt within the fast-paced technology sector can find their products quickly
become unpopular. This necessitates shorter release cycles, which are potentially more expensive.
Musser & O’Reilly (2006) note this as a best practise for Web 2.0 companies, referring to the
“perpetual beta” as evidence. A Web 2.0 service running a perpetual beta release cycle offers their
users services that are not fully tested, on the understanding that some components may not work
as expected. This enables new features to reach the market sooner, rather than undergoing a
lengthy period of internal testing (Musser & O’Reilly, 2006).
The tendency to release new features as early as possible may be reflective of the “get big fast”
strategy observed in the original dot-com bubble companies. Under this strategy, companies aimed
to get their offerings to market as quickly as possible, with the assumption that being first-to-market
improves uptake by users (Oliva, Sterman, & Giese, 2003).
Competition  and  rapid  development  within  the  technology  sector  may have  repercussions  for
investors:  Sahlman and Stevenson (1985)  suggest  that  the  collective  behaviours  of  investors,
particularly  venture  capitalists,  may  be  destructive  for  an  industry.  This  is  exemplified  by  the
Winchester Disk industry between 1977 and 1984.
3.1 The Winchester Disk Bubble (1977-1984) 
A “Winchester Disk”  is a hard disk that  follows the design and operating principles of the first
Winchester Disk designed at IBM in the early 1970s. This was a spinning-platter hard disk, and is
the principal design for contemporary spinning drives. Through research and development,  the
Winchester Disk industry rapidly improved the speed, capacity and reliability of their proprietary
offerings. The later production of industrial standards for these drives led to the de-facto design for
magnetic hard disks, which are still used today.
Many  companies  in  the  Winchester  Disk  industry  were  start-ups  and  typically  required  large
amounts of capital to run their R&D operations, without which they would quickly loose competitive
advantage.  Despite  being  costly  start-ups,  one  Winchester  Disk  company  was  reported  as  a
significantly successful investment, when the value of the company rose 31.75 times following its
Initial Public Offering (IPO).
Enthused by these results, other venture capital companies were keen to see their own portfolio
companies pioneer  technological  breakthroughs and produce similar  performance at  IPO.  This
potential for exceptional returns ensured that high levels of R&D investment continued in the sector
until 1984 (Sahlman & Stevenson, 1985).
However,  the rapid innovations  in  drive design and performance made it  very difficult  for  any
company to maintain market leadership for long enough to exploit their position. Venture capital
companies eventually realised this and lost  confidence in the industry,  causing the collapse of
many disk manufacturers. Of the 100 companies that existed during the bubble, only five remain
today.
Sahlman  and  Stevenson  attribute  the  collapse  of  this  industry  to  Capital  Market  Myopia;  a
phenomenon where investors become so engaged with the companies  they support, they fail to
realise the wider-reaching implications of their collective activities upon the  industry  (Sahlman &
Stevenson, 1985).  This was catalysed by the initial  success story,  and the perception that the
product was destined to (a) become a popular necessity and (b) remain a high-price item. Under
this  theory,  the industry collapsed because competition between  investors  resulted in  mutually
destructive competition between their portfolio companies. Once again, the effects of supply and
demand upon the entire market appear to have been overlooked. 
3.2 Dot-Com Bubble (1995-2000) 
The dot-com bubble began in 1995, shortly after developed countries gained access to the World
Wide Web, and ended in 2000. It comprised many young publically traded internet companies,
funded by venture capital  at  a  time when online trading was a novel  concept.  Many of  these
companies operated at a loss deliberately, providing services for little or no money to increase their
market share. Once they had a suitable market share, they planned to exercise techniques to
monetise it.
Hawkins observed that growth of the bubble prompted the publication of “many articles and books”
about business models, a subject that had rarely been discussed or studied as extensively before
in either the mainstream or academic press (Hawkins, 2004). This observation coincides with the
desire  to  grow market  share,  exhibited  by  many  dot-com start-ups  at  the  time.  Ovila  (2003)
describes the attitude of the time as a ‘get big fast’ strategy, in which retailers would attempt to be
the first to the online market, and discount heavily in order to gain customers.
Further  observation  of  academic  discussion  shows  a  tendency  towards  the  notion  that  the
technological capability of a company should be balanced with organisational capabilities (Wheale
& Amin, 2003). This discounts the then-popular notion that new markets could be created online,
given sufficient  capital  investment and the technological capability.  The flawed notion that new
markets could be created in this way arguably contributed to the speculation surrounding dot-com
companies, and therefore the inflation of their share prices.
Ultimately, investors lost confidence in internet companies because share prices had risen without
an accompanying growth in profit, signalling poor long-term investment prospects. The projected
monetisation opportunities failed to materialise for these ventures, many of which were making
great losses due to their expensive market share growth strategies (Wheale & Amin, 2003).
3.4 Due Diligence and Speculation 
The previous sections found that bubble investors are often willing to leave their area of experience
or expertise. This section introduces due diligence; a conceptual process that may be used to
evaluate an investment opportunity to assist in making a rational, informed decision.
The financial sector safeguards itself from potentially unsafe investments through an evaluative
process of analysis and due diligence, performed upon any new investment opportunity (Sudek,
2006) or potential acquisition. Factors such as the investors’ appetite for risk and objectives are
taken into account,  and the potential  investment  evaluated against  them. Due diligence is  not
limited  to  one  particular  technique;  the  techniques  employed  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the
investment  or  acquisition  (Pack,  2002).  An example  technique for  performing due diligence in
technology operations is shown as an illustrative example.
The Gartner Hype Cycle is a high-level model used to describe and analyse technologies as they
enter a market and become mainstream (Smith, 2003). When used in Gartner reports, it shows the
maturity  of various technologies graphically. “Maturity”, here, is defined as the progression of a
technology through the distinct stages of industry adoption, as defined by Gartner and discussed
further below. Note that the cycle describes technologies, such as the concept of cloud computing,
rather  than  products  of  the  technology,  such  as  Amazon’s  EC2  cloud  computing  platform.
According to Gartner, it is a tool that may be used by management and IT decision makers to
perform due diligence upon IT investments which they do not fully understand (Linden & Fenn,
2003). 
Gartner  reports  plot  contemporary  technology  product  offerings  on  this  chart,  to  aid  decision
makers  in  deciding  whether  a  particular  technology  is  sufficiently  mature  or  reliable  for  their
business. The cycle proceeds through several distinct stages, as shown in Figure 3:
Figure 3 - Gartner Hype Cycle (Linden and Fenn, 2003)
1. In the  “Technology Trigger”  phase, a new technology  is discussed in the media, and it gains
publicity.
2.The “Peak of Inflated Expectations” occurs when the technology is most visible in the media due
to success stories and other coverage. At this phase, some early adopters may begin using the
technology.
3.  The  “Trough of  Disillusionment”  follows,  where the inflated expectations are not  realised in
practical applications of the technology. At this stage, the technology may be updated or repaired
to resolve issues found by early adopters.
4. The “Slope of Enlightenment” arises as people begin to understand and accept the limitations of
the  technology.  At  this  phase,  many  interested  parties  consider  using  the  technology,  create
implementation plans, and integrate it into their business.
5. The “Plateau of Productivity” phase begins when the technology and the resultant products gain
broad commercial acceptance.
Despite its widespread use in Gartner reports, discussion surrounding the Hype Cycle discounts its
use as a valid metric or instrument (Smith, 2003). Critics in the scientific community find particular
fault with its naming as a “cycle”; Gartner does not describe the model as being cyclic, so these
critics describe it as the Hype Curve. Furthermore, the placement of a technology on the curve
does not appear to be backed by quantitative data (Fenn, 2010), and is instead an arbitrary and
often unexplained placement made by a Gartner analyst.
During a discussion at the AYE Conference for Human Systems, Jerry Weinberg voiced criticism of
the model, noting that the circumstances or actions required for the initial “Technology Trigger” are
not  defined  by  Gartner,  so  it  is  impossible  to  know when  the  model  should  be  applied  to  a
technology (Smith,  2003).  He notes  that  by analysing several  of  Gartner’s  own annual  report
publications, technologies vanish and appear at various stages on the model over a period of
years. Thus, Gartner presents the Hype Cycle as an instrument that can be beneficial to decision
makers, but simultaneously disproves its efficacy by arbitrarily moving technologies on the curve
year-by-year.
A further argument is that  Gartner consistently place technologies directly  on  the curve;  if  the
model was backed by quantitative data, a more representative placement would be possible, off
the  curve (Smith,  2003).  The  curve could  then  be  plotted according  to  the  data,  and  proven
thereby.  This  deficiency  suggests  that  technologies  are  forced  into  a  position  on  the
nominally-defined Hype Cycle curve, rather than the curve actually being a trend line that is the
product of on-going quantitative analysis of various technologies.
In its current form, the cycle implies that a technology always reaches the “Plateau of Productivity”
stage. In reality, many technologies never emerge from the disillusionment stage. Nevertheless,
the cycle does contribute value to Gartner reports, providing an executive overview of technologies
for people who do not have time or resource to investigate the technologies themselves.
The hype cycle illustrates the nature of a bubble, albeit a bubble of inflated expectations rather
than actual valuations. At the early states, while early adopters are using the product, expectations
exceed the product’s capabilities. Expectations “crash” when users realise that the products does
not deliver on them all. Finally, a correction occurs, which brings the expectations of the product in
line  with  its  capability.  In  all  these  stages,  the  difference  between  expectations  and  actual
deliverable  capability  is  analogous  to  the  market  valuation  of  a  security,  versus  the  actual
underlying value.
This section has aimed to demonstrate that tools and techniques for due diligence are available,
but  may require expert  interpretation of  the results.  In the Hype Cycle example,  a company’s
attitudes  to  risk  and  adoption  of  premature  technologies  may  require  a  more  specialised
interpretation  of  the  data.  Furthermore,  a  specialist  would  be  capable  of  analysing  other
technologies (analogous with other investments or opportunities) that lie in a similar place in the
results, and draw further insights and conclusions from those associations.
Social Networks and Cloud Computing have featured on Gartner Emerging Technology reports and
on  hype  cycle  charts  therein.  The following  section  focuses on  how these  technologies  have
enabled innovation in Web 2.0 services, and how they are enabling new business models.
3.6 Discussion 
In section 2.2, it was suggested that economic bubbles might form when investors leave their area
of expertise to participate in potentially speculative investment activities in unfamiliar sectors. The
review of technology sector bubbles confirms this; venture capitalists were willing to leave their
area of expertise to become involved in the popular dot-com and Winchester drive industries.
The collapse of the Winchester Disk industry has already been attributed to the concept of Capital
Market Myopia, in which the collective competitive actions of investors is detrimental to an entire
industry ecosystem. This concept could also be applied to the 2001 dot-com bubble. Valliere and
Peterson (2004) show that venture capital was obtained by many web start-ups, and that there was
competition between venture capital firms to invest in web start-ups.
Given the outcome of the dot-com bubble, many companies in the sector would have failed due
diligence tests. Competition between investors to gain exposure to such a sector is indicative of
speculative behaviour.
In discussion 
The author frequently works with clients seeking investment for their new companies, and some
who seek investment for their ongoing, established activities. While discussing the nature of VCs
and their own investors with business, they have described various potential investors as follows:
 “Expensive”.
 “Specialised in a sector”.
 “Wanting to break into a sector”.
These comments provide anecdotal evidence that there exists a range of VC, in terms of price and
sector specialisation. It also supports the notion that some VCs attempt to gain exposure in sectors
they have  never  worked  in.  As  such,  VCs may pay more than a  company is  worth  in  these
situations. Therefore, the concept of Capital Market Myopia and eventuality of investors leaving
their sector of expertise should be taken forward as potential indicators of bubble scenarios. Table
3 shows a summary of the two bubbles discussed here, and uses the same format as the Historic
Bubbles Discussion in 2.4.
Table 3: Summary of bubbles described in this section
Winchester Disk Dot-Com
Initial 
Development
Enterprise demand for products for this 
industry. 
Over-estimation of demand growth.
Over-estimation of attainable prices.
Potential of trade opportunities over the 
Internet
Growth and 
Performance
Competition between companies, by 
products and product development.
Development and discovery of Internet 
business models.
Competition between inexperienced 
investors, trying to produce successful 
portfolio companies.
Collapse Cost of product development.
Short product lifecyle.
Poor profit due to failure of lack of 
business models.
4. Investors Understanding of Novel Technologies
Within  the reviews  of  historic  and  more  recent  technology sector  bubbles,  a  recurring  theme
appears to be the lack of understanding by investors of the limits or costs associated with novel
technologies. This section explores that notion further, through analysis of literature and the case
studies already detailed above.
The widespread use of new and un-tested technology in bubbles has made it difficult for investors
to distinguish between companies likely to succeed and likely to fail. This has been seen in the
following bubbles thus far:
 Dot-com
 Winchester Disk
 Railway Mania
The lack of familiarity or understanding of these technologies inhibited investors from effectively
evaluating their investment opportunities, leading to poorly researched speculative investment in
the bubbles analysed. This is because the investors were unfamiliar with the technology, and the
limits of novel technologies can rarely be known until they are met.
For instance, in the Winchester Disk bubble, the rapid pace of technological evolution meant that
the position of market leadership was often held by a different company each week, in terms of
cost,  performance, quality and orders (Sahlman & Stevenson,  1985). Such rapid changes in a
brand new sector will have limited the experience investors could draw upon.
A set of objectives, and plan for “exiting” the investment should form the basis of evaluation for
even minor investment opportunities. In the situations described above, again due to a lack of
domain familiarity, few investors understood when to exit from their investments. Valuations may
have risen to, and beyond, investors’ “success” criteria but investors chose to pursue further gains,
instead of exiting their investments when “success” was achieved. Furthermore, investors had no
benchmark or objective by which to measure when an investment had succeeded. By the same
logic, the opposite should also be true; investors would have lacked the experience and knowledge
to identify when an investment had failed, and should no longer be pursued. If processes of due
diligence had been correctly enforced, the lack of experience and domain knowledge would have
reduced such investments.
4.1 Investor Attitudes to Technology during the Dot-Com Bubble 
In section 2.3, the concept of Capital Market Myopia was linked to the Winchester Disk bubble. It
may also be feasible to apply this concept to the dot-com bubble of 2001. To test the applicability of
this concept, Valliere and Peterson (2004) interviewed 57 venture capital investors who were active
in the Internet sector during 2001, to understand cognitive processes that might have led to the
inflation of the dot-com bubble.
The investors were asked about their strategy when investing in unfamiliar sectors prior to the
bubble.  In these situations,  the nature of  investment  success criteria  was understood,  but  the
investor may have had limited or no experience in the sector. The resulting cognitive model, shown
in Figure 4, involves “fundamental venture capital operations” of sourcing, screening, structuring,
monitoring and exiting. 
Figure 4 – Cognitive Model of Investors operating in unfamiliar sectors Derived from Valliere &
Peterson (2004)
While described as a “Cognitive Model”, no formal modelling technique appears to be applied.
Nevertheless, the underlying meaning is clear; links between cells represent influences that either
positively or  negatively affect  their  target.  For  instance,  a low exit  valuation for  an investment
contributes positively to investors’ perception of risk.
The same investors were asked about their strategy during the bubble, in relation to the unfamiliar
internet sector. It was found that:
 Investors had no way of knowing when an internet company was successful, because few
(if any) had achieved resounding success at the time.
 Discussions  between  investors  about  the  seemingly  magnificent  prospects  of  internet
companies  encouraged individual  investors  to invest  speculatively,  with  little  or  no due
diligence.
Following these findings, Valliere and Peterson (2004) acknowledged that, in relation to investors
in the Internet bubble, “forces were operating that were not represented in the simple cognitive
model of Figure 4”.
Figure 5 shows Valliere and Peterson’s subsequent development of the cognitive model, which
incorporates changes to address these behaviours. The original model is shown in white boxes,
and additions are shown in shaded boxes.
Figure 5: Cognitive Model of Investors during the dot-com bubble (Valliere and Peterson, 2005)
A closed positive reinforcement loop exists within the shaded cells on the right side of the model.
Under bubble conditions,  this  causes a rise in  entry valuations for  companies and speculative
investment  through  the  “hype”  components.  Under  normal  circumstances,  the  links  in  the
unshaded model components result in a balanced process. That is, there is no perpetual positive
or negative reinforcement.
The “Perceived Difference of Unfamiliar Business Models” cell is noted as decreasing “Perceived
Risk” during bubble situations,  which may appear contrary to expectations–unfamiliarity should
surely contribute to a sense of risk. Valliere and Peterson attribute their model to a key finding in
their  interviews;  that investors in a bubble situation assume the content of  due diligence must
change because they are unfamiliar with the business model or technology employed. Another
factor behind this model decision was the assumption by bubble investors that the failure of one
business model increased the likelihood of a working one being found in the remaining companies.
In a later paper, Valliere and Peterson develop their 2004 work and respond to questions raised by
the  community.  Their  work  was  constructed  using  prospect  theory:  an  economic  theory  for
analysing decision-making by individuals in situations that involve risk and reward (Kahneman &
Tversky,  1979).  The community asked whether alternative behavioural  analysis  methods might
reveal alternative models, suggesting that it could not be applied to all investors during the bubble
period.
Valliere and Peterson had focused only on venture capitalists in their first work, and agreed that
another analytical framework may be more suited to the “less experienced, but rational, internet
investors” (Valliere & Peterson, 2005). This means that the formation of the dot-com bubble may
be attributed to more than just venture capitalists, which may be true when companies grew and
some began to file for IPOs.
5 Future Directions
On the study of various economic bubbles, some have correlations on each other. For example,
the bankruptcy and the rapid fall of certain industries and companies are due to the unexpected
factors that make the businesses to decline sharply. All these factors can be summed as follows.
Over competition in the market; rapid falls in demand and popularity; government and/or company
policies that have made irreversible and adverse impacts; slow response to problem and lack of
effective contingency plans. All the unexpected events happen at short notice so that the risk can
rise  out  of  control  and cannot  be managed.  This  is  similar  to  William Sharpe's  CAPM model
presented in his Nobel speech in which risks are classified as either under control (unsystematic)
and or uncontrolled (systematic) risks (Sharpe, 1992). Thus, careful, thorough and effective risk
management,  guideline,  tolerance and analysis are required to reduce impacts from economic
bubbles, and to understand the extent of damage and prevent or postpone the future economic
bubbles. The following is proposed to address this challenging task:
Firstly, important metrics that can cause the economic bubbles need to be identified. Each metric
has to be quantified and measured over a period of time. They will be used for data analysis to
understand  any  implications  and  any  correlation  between  different  events,  periods  and  case
studies. Secondly, suitable datasets from similar studies will be investigated. These datasets will
be used to study the cause, recommended resolution and analysis of economic bubbles. Thirdly, a
suitable model  should be used to analyse the full  impacts caused by economic  bubbles.  The
selected model needs to be able to identify key metrics and process all the datasets. The types of
risks may include the controlled and uncontrolled, the internal and external. All the values for risks
need to be monitored and analysed. Outputs can be in the form of visualisation so that unexplored
areas can be identified and checked more thoroughly. 
Organisational Sustainability Modelling (OSM) is one such model. It can keep track of risk and
inform the stakeholders with  the implications  and interpretation  of  risk analysis  (Chang et  al.,
2016).  This  includes how to identify and measure key metrics.  OSM also uses its  own linear
regression method to analyse beta, the uncontrolled risk value. Beta should be kept below 1. If the
beta value in any month exceeds 1, then the warnings will be provided to the stakeholders for them
to take more cautious steps to minimise the risks involved. OSM can also compute the values of
internal and external risks, so that businesses can identify what goes wrong with their strategies
and operations, so that operational and strategic risks can be reduced. The data analysis of OSM
includes easy to understand statistics and also visualisation, the latter of which includes analytics,
graphs  and  charts  to  allow business  leaders  to  understand  the  impacts  of  the  risks  to  their
businesses.  The status of  “return” can be analysed together with risk.  The definition of  return
depends on each organisation's focus, out of technical, financial and user focus approaches. The
stakeholders, project leaders and investors can find that understanding the status of risk and return
in real-time can be useful  for  the projects  involved.  Different  case studies have been used to
support  the validity and usefulness of  OSM. For example,  Vodafone has been studied for  the
mobile  cloud  services  and  strategies  in  2010  including  analysing  the  risk  and  return  of  their
investment (Chang et al., 2011). Future directions may include the use of suitable models such as
OSM to understand the implications of economic bubbles, so that results from quantitative analysis
and  visualisation  can  support  hypotheses  causing  economic  bubbles  and  correlation  between
different economic bubbles.
Another topic of discussion is whether Web 2.0 may fail due to a shortage of support and esteem.
Web 2.0 is the second generation of the internet development and service. The main difference
between Web 1.0 and 2.0 is, Web 2.0 allows users to broadcast their news, share with peers and
exchange ideas. The rise of Web 2.0 has created profitable business models for technological
giants such as Facebook, Google and mobile service providers. 
Before  discussing  whether  Web 2.0  maybe  another  bubble,  other  technological  related topics
should be considered. One of such an example is the Internet of Things (IoT). The rise of the IoT
means that all  the users are not only connected to the internet but also between each other's
mobile devices. This allows everyone to stay connected and collaborate with each other. IoT can
also blend with Cloud Computing to allow users to get the services available in Cloud Computing
and then establish community-like interactions with other users in IoT (Gubbi et al., 2013). IoT is
also closely related to smart cities, whereby all the data on all the vehicles and mobile devices can
be captured and sent for analysis. This allows the government and businesses to understand the
behavioural patterns of their people, so that they can make more accurate predictions based on
the data they have analysed (Gubbi et al., 2013;  Hwang et al., 2013). Apart from IoT, another area
for growing needs is social network analysis. The focus is to study the relationship between people
by the use of innovative techniques, whereby the understanding about the strength of friendship
can be useful for businesses (Chang, 2016). When the businesses know the relationship between
themselves, customers and suppliers periodically, they can revise their strategies according to the
suggestions from social network analysis. 
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This literature review has examined previous economic bubbles together with some of their causes
and identified characteristics in  each one.  Over time,  investors have learnt  the procedure and
importance of performing due diligence upon investment opportunities. Nevertheless, when hype
and speculative investment surrounds a company or market sector, the findings in this chapter
suggest that investors may be willing to reduce due diligence and take unmeasured risks in sectors
with which they lack experience.
The untested nature of business models employed by modern web companies means that many
investors are fundamentally unfamiliar  with the sector.  These companies have the potential  to
generate revenue in novel ways through their user databases and other data, but few current
business models have proven this successful. The corporate venture capital investors appear to
view larger web companies with optimism, due to the size of their user-bases. The web sector is
developing rapidly due to technological progress supporting the phenomenon of Web 2.0, which
has two effects. Firstly, unfamiliar business models are emerging, which are difficult for investors to
evaluate. Secondly, there are fewer barriers to entry and overheads in the Web 2.0 sector, which
would otherwise reduce possible financial gains. All the economic bubbles have reflected that risk
management,  guidelines  and  analysis  are  essential  to  any  form  of  business  or  government.
Several recommendations have been suggested for future directions.
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